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Namazi and Cahill: University Hate Speech Codes

UNIVERSITY HATE SPEECH CODES:
A NECESSARY METHOD IN THE PROCESS OF
ERADICATING THE UNIVERSAL WRONG OF
RACISM
INTRODUCTION

This Note was inspired by a series of hate motivated incidents
that occurred at various colleges and universities over recent

years. 1 The painful impact of these incidents on the academic
1. The number of hate incidents is quite disturbing in light of both their
frequent occurrence, and the fact that they occur at some of the nation's most
prestigious educational institutions. See, e.g., Judith Barra Austin, Panel
Tackles Conflict Between Harassment Lmvs, First Amendment, GANNETT
NEWS SERV., Sept. 10, 1992 (stating that a student at Clemson University
arrived at what she believed to be her apartment for the semester only to be
told by her roommate that they could not room together because she was
black); Sarah Bowen, Can Racist Slurs be Banned on Campus?, USA TODAY,
Oct. 15, 1992, at 11A (stating that at the University of Texas "individuals in a
fraternity painted a car with obscenities targeted at blacks" and that at the
University of Wisconsin, the Ku Klux Klan made on-campus attempts to
recruit); Alexander Cockburn, Dangerous Diversions; Hate Speech and
Political CorrectnessBeat the Devil, THE NATION, May 27, 1991, Vol. 252,
No. 20, at 690 (stating that at Brown University, a student walked through
campus shouting an array of epithets that included: "Fucking nigger," "What
are you a faggot?" and "Fucking Jew"); Ellen Goodman, Free Speech v.
Equality, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 17, 1991, at A27 (stating that at Harvard,
confederate flags are displayed, despite wide spread recognition of their
symbolic reference to an era of slavery and institutional racism); Charles
Leroux, Hate Speech Enters ComputerAge, CH. TRB., Oct. 27, 1991, at C4
(stating that at the University of Wisconsin, a student sent a message through
the computer system to an Iranian faculty member stating "Death to all Arabs!
Die Islamic Scumbags"); Ken Myers, An Incident at Stanford Sparks More
Dialogue on 'PC' Speech, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 9, 1992, at 4 (stating that at
Stanford University, a first year law student walked through a dormitory and
uttered a series of homophobic remarks including "Faggot! Hope you die of
AIDS! Can't wait 'til you die, faggot"); Katherine Shaver, Congress Examines
the Appropriateness of Universities' Hate Speech Codes, STATE NEVS SERV.,
Sept. 10, 1992 (reporting that on Halloween, students dressed up as members
of the Ku Klux Klan and called a black student a "nigger," and that at the
University of South Florida, in the Fall of 1991, anti-Semitic graffiti defaced
various buildings throughout the campus); Stanford, UC Unruffled By Hate
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communities, coupled with the realization that these incidents
extended across the country, compelled the writers to discuss the
issue of hate speech on the college campus.
It has been nearly four decades since the United States Supreme
Court declared discrimination on the basis of race
unconstitutional and opened the gates of equal opportunity to
people of color. 2 However, college campuses are presently
embroiled in an epidemic of hate acts directed at students of
various ethnic, religious and racial backgrounds. 3 In an effort to

provide an equal educational opportunity to all students, many
colleges and universities have adopted speech and conduct codes

to alleviate the profound harm of such discriminatory acts. 4

Speech Ruling, S.F. CHRON., June 29, 1992, at A15 (reporting that at Stanford
University, two white males defaced a Beethoven poster with racial
caricatures, and then posted it on the door of a black student's room).
Our law school was also affected by this hate-motivated phenomenon. In
May of 1991, a Touro student circulated a flier listing the name of almost
every student in the class of 1993, along with their undergraduate grades and
LSAT scores. The names of minority students appeared in boldface, and a
racist message was attached which suggested that minority students were given
preferential treatment in the admissions process. Additionally, in October of
1991, a racially motivated cartoon was displayed in a men's restroom
portraying disparate treatment in the admissions interview process.
2. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). Brown held
that "segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even
though the physical facilities and other 'tangible' factors may be equal,
deprive[s] the children of the minority group equal educational opportunities."
Id.
3. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
4. See Steven R. Glaser, Sticks and Stones May Break My Bones, But
Words Can Never Hurt Me: Regulating Speech on University Campuses, 76
MARQ. L. REv. 265 (1992). Glaser found that given the staggering number of
racial attacks on college campuses, "[m]inority groups urged college officials
to adopt regulations punishing derogatory and discriminatory language." Id. at
266. College officials were "expected to acknowledge and attempt to remedy
the harmful effects of intolerance while remaining an institution of higher
learning committed to freedom of expression." Id. However, many school
officials were pressured into enacting hate speech codes. Id. (citing Breaking
the Codes, NEw REPUBLIC, July 8, 1991, at 7, 8); Linda P. Campbell, College
Debate:Free Speech vs. Freedom of Bigotry, CHI. Tm., Mar. 18, 1991, at 1;
see also Thomas H. Moore, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul: A Curious Way to
Protect Free Speech, 71 N.C. L. REv. 1252 (1993). Moore lists several
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These codes are often paradigmed after the "fighting words"
doctrine. 5 However, in light of the diminishing scope of the
doctrine, 6 and the nature of these hate expressions, 7 it is quite
universities that adopted hate speech codes including "the University of
California, Emory University, the University of Michigan, the University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and the University of Wisconsin." Id. at 1255
n.9. For example, Stanford University adopted a speech code to prevent
discriminatory harassment based on "hatred or contempt for students, faculty,
or university employees on 'the basis of their sex, race, color, handicap,
religion, sexual orientation, or national or ethnic origin.'" Id.; Ronald J.
Rychiak, Civil Rights, Confederate Flags, and Political Correctness: Free
Speech and Race Relations on Campus, 66 TuL. L. REv. 1411, 1424 (1992)
(noting that speech codes "protect students from acts of violence and
harassment").
5. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). In
Chaplinsky, the Supreme Court defined the "fighting words" doctrine:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech,
the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to
raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene,
the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words - those
which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace.
Id.; see also, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992). The Court
concluded that although expressions reached by the St. Paul Ordinance were
proscribed under the "fighting words" doctrine, the ordinance was still
unconstitutional since it "prohibit[ed] otherwise permitted speech solely on the
basis of the subjects the speech address[ed]." Id. at 2542; Lewis v. City of
New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 143 (1974); Sambo's Restaurants, Inc. v. Ann
Arbor, 663 F.2d 686, 694 (6th Cir. 1981) (noting that the Supreme Court has
held that "suppression of speech which in no way tends to incite an immediate
breach of the peace cannot be justified under Chaplinsky's 'fighting words'
doctrine" (citing Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 524-27 (1977))); UWM
Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 744 F. Supp. 1163
(E.D. Wis. 1991). The court stated that the University speech code, which
prohibited students from directing discriminatory epithets at particular
individuals with intent to demean them and create hostile educational
environments, went beyond the scope of the "fighting words" doctrine. Id.;
Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (holding
that the University speech code was unconstitutionally overbroad since the
effect of the code was "to prohibit speech because it disagreed with ideas or
messages sought to be conveyed").
6. See R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2538. The Supreme Court, in effect,
diminished the scope of the "fighting words" doctrine by invalidating a city
ordinance which forbade speech "that insult[ed], or provoke[d] violence, 'on
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likely that existing speech codes, if challenged, may be held
unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court. 8
the basis of race, color or creed, religion, or gender.'" 1d. at 2547. The Court
stated that "[d]isplays containing abusive invective, no matter how vicious or
severe, are permissible unless they are addressed to one of the specified
disfavored topics." Id. Thus, "fighting words" cannot be restricted where
there are "special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on
disfavored subjects." Id.; see also UWM Post, Inc., 774 F. Supp. at 1170 The
court explained that the "fighting words" doctrine has a narrow scope to
include only words "which tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace"
and applies where "fighting words" are "directed at the person of the
hearer .... " Id.
7. Hate motivated expressions on the nation's university campuses are
often not face-to-face, but rather directed at a group of students, generally of
similar ethnic backgrounds, ethnic composition or sexual orientation. See, e.g.,
Bowen, supra note 1, at 11A (showing incidents where there is little physical
confrontation in hate crimes such as an incident at the University of Texas
including individuals in a fraternity painting a car with racial epithets targeted
blacks); Anthony Flint, Swastika Often a Tool of Shock, Not Hate; Experts Say
Youths May Use It In Ignorance, BOSTON GLOBE, JAN. 31, 1994, at 13
(explaining that some students from Boston College found a swastika formed
by bundles of newspapers); Judith Gaines, City Study Finds 58 Percent of Hate
Crimes Done For Thrill, BOSTON GLOBE, May 28, 1993, at 21 (stating that
fifty-eight percent of hate crimes are done anonymously and for the "thrill of
it" and aimed at particular groups); Jack Levin, HatemongersAmong Us, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, July 31, 1993, at 10 ("[M]ost [hate crimes] are
committed by otherwise ordinary citizens--students in the dorm, the guy at the
next desk at work or the neighbor down the block."); Stephanie Mansfield,
Gays on Campus; Homosexual College Students; University of Kansas,
REDBOOK, Vol. 181, No. 1, May, 1993, at 124 (describing various attacks on
homosexuals on college campuses such as one which offers free baseball bats
for gay bashing).
8. See University of Wisconsin Repeals Ban on 'Hate Speech,' NY
TIMES, Sept. 14, 1992, at A10. The University of Wisconsin imposed a hatespeech code, one of the first of its kind, in 1989. Id. In 1991, this code was
declared unconstitutionally overbroad by the Federal District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin. UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of Univ.
of Wis. Sys., 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991). The speech code provided
disciplinary sanctions for the following expressions:
For racist or discriminatory comments, epithets or other expressive
behavior directed at an individual or on separate occasions at different
individuals, or for physical conduct, if such comments, epithets or other
expressive behavior or physical conduct intentionally:
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Universities, however, as institutions of higher learning, are
vested with the duty to effectively implement the mandates of
Brown v. Board of Education.9 Today, the recurrence of heinous
acts of hate on our nation's college campuses, reminiscent of preBrown times, threaten the Brown promise of equal access to
education for all. l o Salvation of this principle rests upon the
1. Demean the race, sex, religion, color, creed, disability, sexual
orientation, national origin, ancestry or age of the individual or
individuals; and
2. Create an intimidating, hostile or demeaning environment for
education, university related work, or other university - authored
activity ....
Id. at 1165. The code cited some examples of expressions that would place a
student in violation of the code. Among the cited examples include a student
"intentionally ma[king] demeaning remarks to an individual based on that
person's ethnicity, such as name calling, racial slurs, or 'jokes.'" Id. at 1166.
Subsequently, the University modified the code to include only direct
confrontations. See University of Wisconsin Repeals Ban on 'Hate Speech,'
supra at A10. In light of the R.A.V. decision, the University repealed the
modified code in September of 1992. Id.
9. See generally 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (stating that "[s]chool authorities
have the primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving [racial
discrimination in schools]; courts will have to consider whether the action of
school authorities constitutes good faith implementation of the governing
constitutional principles"); see also Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S.
189, 222 (1973) (holding that school districts "have an affirmative duty.., to
eliminate segregation in the schools" (citing Swanm v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971))).
10. See Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating
Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431. Lawrence broadened the
meaning of Brown and articulated a principle upon which all antidiscrimination laws rest, mainly "the principle of equal citizenship." Id. at
438. He argued that Brown can be read as regulating the content of racist
speech since "[s]egregation serves its purposes by conveying an idea." Id.
Thus, the message sent to the public is that blacks are inferior, which
ultimately injures all black individuals. Id. Therefore, "[a]s a regulation of
racist speech, the decision is an exception to the usual rule that regulation of
speech content is presumed unconstitutional." Id. Since the goal of segregation
is to promote "white supremacy," then "Brown and its progeny require that the
systematic group defamation of segregation be disestablished." Id. at 441.
Lawrence also concluded that "white supremacists' conduct or speech is
forbidden by the equal protection clause" and mandated by Brown. Id. at 442.
Lawrence noted that where the university fails to protect victims from acts of
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recognition that speech codes are a necessary means of ensuring
the vitality of the Brown legacy.
This Note will attempt to articulate a compelling justification
for the adoption of hate speech regulations on all state university
campuses. Part I will examine the recent Supreme Court decision
of R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul,11 and analyze its impact on the
"fighting words" doctrine and on existing university hate speech
codes. Part II will articulate an independent ground for the
adoption of hate speech codes on college campuses based on the
12
Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education.

I. R.A.V.v. CITY OF ST. PAUL
In the early hours of June 21, 1990, R.A.V. and several other

teenagers burned a cross made of broken chair legs inside the
fenced yard of a black family. 13 The petitioner was convicted
under the St. Paul Minnesota Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance. 14
hate and to protect "their right to pursue their education free from this kind of
degradation and humiliation, then.. . there are constitutional values at stake."
Id. at 448.
11. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In Brown, the Supreme Court found that in the
field of public education "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently
unequal." Id. at 495. The Supreme Court based its holding on findings that
separating minority students solely because of their race "generates a feeling of
inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and
minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." Id. at 494; see also infra notes
95-130 and accompanying text.
13. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541.
14. Id. at 2540. The defendant's conduct could have been punished under
several state criminal statutes such as those prohibiting arson, terrorist threats,
or criminal damage to property. Id. at 2541. Instead, the teenagers were
charged with violating two other laws. Id. One punished racially motivated
assaults and was not challenged. Id. The other was St. Paul's Bias-Motivated
Crime Ordinance. Id. The ordinance in question provides:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object,
appellation, characterization or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has
reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in
others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits
disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
ST. PAUL, MINN. LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990).
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The state supreme court upheld the statute as falling within the
"fighting words" doctrine. 15 The Supreme Court of the United
States overruled the state supreme court by unanimously holding
the statute unconstitutional. 16 However, the Justices sharply
17
disagreed in their reasoning.

The majority began its analysis by reiterating the wellestablished constitutional principle that the First Amendment
prohibits the government from restricting speech based on

disapproval of its content. 18 The majority posited an exception to
this general principle,

expression
words."

19

consisting of certain categories of

such as obscenity,
However,

the

defamation,

majority

and

stated that

"fighting

even these

15. The procedural posture was as follows: The trial court dismissed the
charge on the ground that the ordinance was substantially overbroad and
impermissibly content-based; the state supreme court reversed, holding that the
ordinance could reasonably be interpreted to prohibit only "fighting words"
which fall outside the protection of the First Amendment. In re Welfare of
R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 510-11 (Minn. 1991).
16. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2550-51.
17. Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy,
Souter, and Thomas delivered the majority opinion. They posited that the
ordinance was facially unconstitutional because it prohibited speech based upon
its content. Id. at 2542. Justice White, joined by Justices O'Connor,
Blackmun, and Stevens who joined in part, filed a concurring opinion arguing
that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it was "fatally over-broad" and
that the majority's reasoning was "transparently wrong." Id. at 2550-51
(White, J., concurring). Justice Stevens filed a separate concurring opinion in
which he argued that both the majority opinion and Justice White's concurring
opinion were wrong in their categorical approach. Id. at 2561 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). Justice Blackmun filed a brief separate concurrence to emphasize
the harmful impact of the majority's opinion on the categorical exceptions. Id.
at 2560 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
18. Id. at 2542; see, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 318
(1990) ("If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is
that the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."); Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397 (1989) (stating that government may not prohibit speech solely
because it disfavors its content).
19. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2542-43; see, e.g., Mari J. Matsuda, Public
Response to Racist Speech: Consideringthe Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv.
2320, 2351 (1989). The reason for the adoption of these limited categories is
generally related to the substantial harm caused by the speech as compared to
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categories are not "entirely invisible to the Constitution." 20 The
majority disagreed with the notion that [fighting words]
"constitute 'no part of the expression of ideas.'"21 Rather, the
majority likened "fighting words" to "a noisy sound truck," 22 in
that they are both "'mode[s] of speech,'" 23 and may convey an
idea but neither, standing alone, is protected by the First
Amendment. 24 "As with the sound truck, however, so also with
'fighting words': The government may not regulate use based on
hostility - or favoritism - towards the underlying message
expressed."25
Applying this content restriction standard to the St. Paul
ordinance, 26 the majority concluded that it was "facially

the low societal value of the regulated speech. Id.; see also Richard Delgado,
Legal Theory, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in
Collision, 85 Nw. UNIv. L. REV. 343, 377 (1991). Professor Delgado
suggests that over the last century the Court has carved out several exceptions
to protected speech. Some examples of such exceptions include: Zurcher v.
Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (speech used to form a criminal
conspiracy); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (speech that is
obscene); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (speech that defames or
libels a group); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (speech
that amounts to "fighting words"); Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47
(1919) (falsely shouting fire in a crowded theater). Id.
20. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2543. Although these categories of speech, may
"be regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable content," the
Constitution prohibits regulation that is based on the specific content of such
speech. For example, the government may regulate libelous or obscene
material, but may not prohibit only those libelous or obscene material which
criticize the government. Id.
21. Id. at 2544.
22. Id. at 2545.
23. Id. (quoting Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 282 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
24. Id. The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;
or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
25. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2545.
26. See supra note 14 for text of the ordinance.
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Other "fighting words" were not included in

ordinance. 28

The majority asserted that "[tihose who wish to
the
use 'fighting words' in connection with other ideas - to express
hostility, for example, on the basis of political affiliation, union
membership, or homosexuality - are not covered."29 Further, the
Court stated, "'fighting words' that do not themselves invoke
race, color, creed, religion, or gender... would seemingly be
usable... [on the sides] of those arguing in favor of racial,
color, etc. tolerance and equality, but could not be used by that
speaker's opponents."30
The majority stated with clarity that the First Amendment
prohibited St. Paul from imposing restrictions on certain
"fighting words" simply because the expressed views are
disfavored. 31 St. Paul, the majority noted, "ha[d] no such
authority to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while
requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensbury Rules." 32
Next, the majority addressed St. Paul's contention that even if
the ordinance did restrict protected expression, it should survive
strict scrutiny analysis because the ordinance served a compelling
27. R.A.V., 113 S. Ct. at 2547. Despite the fact that the ordinance, as
construed by the Minnesota Supreme Court, reached only "fighting words,"
the Supreme Court held that the ordinance included only those "fighting
words" that were based on "race, color, creed, religion or gender." Id.
28. Id. The Court stated that "[d]isplays containing abusive invective, no
matter how vicious or severe, are permissible unless they are addressed to one
of the specified disfavored topics." Id.
29. Id.; see also Simon & Schuster Inc. v. Members of N. Y. State Crime
Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991) (holding that the concept of protected
speech includes verbal or written speech which has been propounded by a
criminal concerning his crime and that laws providing financial disincentives
for criminals to speak about their crimes run afoul of the First Amendment
unless they are sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government
interest).
30. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. 2547-48.
31. Id. at 2547.
32. Id. at 2548. The Marquis of Queensbury Rules were a boxing code of
fair play developed in the nineteenth century by the eighth Marquis of
Queensbury to govern boxing matches. Simply stated, it is "a code of fair play
presumed to apply in any fight." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, UNABRIDGED
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government interest. 33 While the majority conceded that the
asserted interests were compelling, it concluded that the content
of the discrimination was not reasonably necessary to achieve this
interest. 34 The majority explained that the only interest served by
the ordinance was the city officials' interest in demonstrating
their political bias toward certain groups. 35 The opinion
concluded by suggesting that "St. Paul ha[d] sufficient [contentneutral] means at its disposal to prevent such behavior without
36
adding the First Amendment to the fire."
In response, Justice White, in his concurrence, charged the

majority with departing from precedent in two instances. First,
the majority abandoned the principle of stare decisis in the area
of "fighting words"

and

"adopt[ed]

an untried theory."

37

Second, he felt "the Court refuse[d] to sustain the ordinance even
though it would survive under the strict scrutiny applicable to
other protected expressions. 38
Justice White reasoned that stare decisis should dictate the
Court's path in analysis and asserted that the majority had

abandoned

the

overbreadth

tradition 39 by enunciating

an

33. R.A. V, 112 S. Ct. at 2549. The asserted compelling state interest was
to protect "the basic human rights of members of groups that have historically
been subjected to discrimination, including the right of such group members to
live in peace where they wish." Id.
34. Id. at 2549-50.
35. Id. at 2550. The Court stated that this "is precisely what the First
Amendment forbids." Id.
36. Id. The majority stated that "[ain ordinance not limited to the favored
topics... would have precisely the same beneficial effect" and would prevent
bias behavior. Id.
37. Id. at 2551 (White, J., concurring). Justice White, with whom Justices
Blackmun, O'Connor and Stevens concurred, asserted that the majority failed
to follow precedents which the Supreme Court had established regarding the
analysis of "unprotected speech." Id. (White, J., concurring). Justice White
contended that R.A. V. could have been decided by invalidating the ordinance in
accordance with cases such as Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568
(1942). Id. at 2551-52 (White, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 2554 (White, J., concurring).
39. The concurring opinion stated that "Itihis case could easily be decided
within the contours of established First Amendment law by holding, as
petitioner argue[d], that the St. Paul ordinance [wals fatally overbroad because

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol10/iss2/11

10

1994]

Namazi and Cahill: University Hate Speech Codes

UNIVERSITY HATE SPEECH CODES

"underinclusiveness" evaluation. 4o That is, the Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence had previously determined that there
were certain categories of expression that did not deserve First
Amendment protection. 4 1 The "fighting words" doctrine, Justice
White posited, was one of those limited categories. 42 The
it criminalize[d] not only unprotected expression but expression protected by
the First Amendment." Id. at 2550 (White, J., concurring). Generally, the
rationale for the application of the overbreadth doctrine is that statutes that
regulate speech might deter or chill persons from engaging in speech or
activity that is protected under the First Amendment. Id. at 2553 (White, J.,
concurring).
40. Id. at 2553 (White, J., concurring). Justice White stated that "the
Court's new 'underbreadth' creation serves no desirable function. Instead it
permits, indeed invites, the continuation of expressive conduct that in this case
is evil and worthless in First Amendment terms .... " Id. (White, J.,
concurring) (citations omitted).
41. Id. at 2551 (White, J., concurring). In the areas of privacy and
defamation, the Court has declared that expressing intimate and private facts
about a private individual is subject to civil damages, as is the spread of
untruths damaging to both public and private figures. See Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (stating that a credit
agency's false report regarding a construction company's credit is not
protected speech); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (holding
that states may enforce a legal remedy for false statements injurious to a
private individual's reputation); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964) (holding that public officials may seek damages from a media
defendant for libel upon a showing of actual malice); Beauharnais v. Illinois,
343 U.S. 250 (1952) (stating that libelous statements aimed at groups, like
those aimed at individuals, do not deserve First Amendment protection).
Similarly, in the area of obscenity, the Court, over two decades ago, declared
obscenity as not deserving protection because the Court considered obscenity to
be utterly without redeeming social importance. Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476 (1957).
42. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2551-52 (White, J., concurring). The "fighting
words" doctrine was first articulated in the case of Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). Chaplinsky was distributing his religious
message by way of literature before a crowd of unsympathetic listeners. Id. at
569-70. While being escorted towards the police station, Chaplinsky accused
the city marshal of being a "God damned racketeer" and, that the city
government was comprised of "Fascists or agents of Fascists." Id. at 569. He
was convicted under a New Hampshire statute narrowed by the New
Hampshire Supreme Court. Id. at 569. The United States Supreme Court, in a
unanimous decision, upheld the New Hampshire statute as construed by the
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rationale for this categorical exclusion is that "their expressive
content is worthless or of de minimis value to society." 4 3 Thus,
in evaluating each category and its scope, the Court has
consistently engaged in a content based evaluation. 4 4 Yet, as
Justice White noted, the majority dismissed the clearly
established principle that certain categories of expression did not
deserve First Amendment protection because their content was
worthless, and instead suggested that the "earlier Courts did not
mean" what they said. 45 Justice White argued that the majority
was suggesting that "[s ] hould the government want to criminalize
certain fighting words, the Court now requires it to criminalize
all fighting words."46
According to Justice White:
Fighting words are not a means of exchanging views, rallying
supporters, or registering a protest; they are directed against
individuals to provoke violence or to inflict injury. Therefore, a
ban on all fighting words or on a subset of the fighting words
category would restrict only the social evil of hate speech,
without creating the danger of driving viewpoints from the
marketplace. 47
state court. Id. at 573-74. The Court reasoned that Chaplinsky's epithet lacked
communicative value, since an "[a]rgument is unnecessary to demonstrate that
the appellations... are epithets likely to provoke the average person to
retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace." Id. at 574. In dicta,
Justice Murphy, for the first time, enunciated the standard for evaluating
"fighting words." Simply stated, the test was whether men of average
intelligence would be incited to react violently to words and expressions
directed at an individual or a small group which by their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite immediate violence. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573.
43. R.A. V, 112 S. Ct. at 2552 (White, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
44. Id. (White, J., concurring).
45. Id. (White, J., concurring).
46. Id. at 2553 (White, J., concurring). But see the majority opinion, in
which Justice Scalia described the concurrence assertions as "the concurrences'
own invention." Id. at 2545. The Court stated, "the First Amendment imposes
not an 'underinclusiveness' limitation but a 'content discrimination' limitation
upon a State's prohibition of proscribable speech." Id. at 2545.
47. Id. at 2553 (White, J., concurring) (citations omitted). The debut of
the marketplace metaphor in American jurisprudence came from the dissenting
opinion of Justice Holmes where he argued that "the ultimate good desired is
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The majority described this emphasis on the injury caused by
such speech as "word-play." 4 8 Additionally, the majority stated
that
What ma[de] the anger, fear, sense of dishonor, etc. produced by
violation of this ordinance distinct from the anger, fear, sense of
dishonor, etc. produced by other fighting words is nothing other
than the fact that it is caused by a distinctive idea, conveyed by a
49
distinctive message.
The majority expressly approved the idea of confronting speech
or behavior that threaten "'diverse communities' . . . but the
manner of that confrontation [could] not consist of selective
limitations upon speech."50 It explained:
[Tihe reason why fighting words are categorically excluded from
the protection of the First Amendment is not that their content
communicates any particular idea, but that their content
and
socially
intolerable
a
particularly
embodies
the
speaker
unnecessary mode of expressing whatever idea
wishes to convey. St. Paul has not singled out an especially
offensive mode of expression - it has not, for example, selected
for prohibition only those fighting words that communicate ideas
in a threatening (as opposed to a merely obnoxious) manner. 5 1
Justice White termed the impact of the majority's analysis of
the "fighting words" doctrine on First Amendment jurisprudence
as "negative." 52 According to Justice White, this holding
"necessarily signals that expressions of violence, such as the
better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that
truth is the only ground upon which [the people's] wishes safely can be carried

out." Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
48. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2548. While, Justice Scalia's response was
specifically directed at Justice Stevens' concurring opinion, the concept of

injury to the listeners was also articulated by the concurring opinions of White,
Blackmun, and Stevens. Id. at 2550-71.
49. Id. at 2548.

50. Id. (quoting In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 508 (Minn.
1991)).
51. Id. at 2548-49 (emphasis in original).
52. Id. at 2553 (White, J., concurring).
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message of intimidation and racial hatred... are of sufficient
value to outweigh the social interest in order and morality that
ha[d] traditionally placed such fighting words outside the First
Amendment.,, 53
It is quite significant, however, that while Justice White's

concurring opinion vehemently disagreed with the majority's
analysis, it agreed with the outcome on the separate ground that
the St. Paul ordinance was unconstitutionally overbroad. 54 He
reasoned that "[a]lthough the ordinance reache[d] conduct that
[was] unprotected, it also ma[de] criminal expressive conduct that

cause[d] only hurt feelings, offense, or resentment, and [wa]s
protected by the First Amendment." 55 Consequently, the
overbreadth doctrine dictates a prohibition on statutes that are so
vague or overbroad that they either include protected speech in

53. Id. (White, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 2558 (White, J., concurring). In general, following Chaplinsky,
the theories employed by the Court when striking down statutes designed to
prohibit or regulate "fighting words," have been the vagueness and
overbreadth doctrines. See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404,
2410 (1990) (striking down Flag Burning Act as violative of the First
Amendment); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 524 (1972) (striking a
Georgia statute on its face because it was not limited to words "hav[ing] a
direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to whom, individually,
the remark[s] [are] addressed"); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 5 (1949)
(overturning a municipal ordinance prohibiting breaches of the peace as
overbroad).
55. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2560 (White, J., concurring). Generally, the
rationale for the application of both doctrines is that statutes that regulate
speech might deter or chill persons from engaging in speech or activity that is
protected under the First Amendment. Thus, in order for the governmental
regulation to be tolerated it must be drawn with "narrow specificity." NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). In NAACP, Justice Brennan explained:
[T]he instant decree may be invalid if it prohibits privileged exercises of
First Amendment rights whether or not the record discloses that the
petitioner has engaged in privileged conduct. For in appraising a
statute's inhibitory effect upon such rights, this Court has not hesitated
to take in to account possible applications of the statute in other factual
contexts besides that at bar.
Id. at 432 (emphasis added).
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the prohibition or leave an individual without clear guidance as to
the boundary between prohibited and protected speech. 56
In applying the overbreadth doctrine to the St. Paul ordinance,

Justice White concluded that the ordinance reached not only
physical harm but also "expressive conduct that caused only hurt
feelings, offense, or resentment ..... 57 Psychological harm, he
noted, was beyond the well defined boundaries of the "fighting
words" doctrine. 5 8 Thus, the St. Paul ordinance was "fatally
59
overbroad" and therefore unconstitutional.

56. See, e.g., Gooding, 405 U.S. at 518. The Court, in an opinion
authored by Justice Brennan, struck down a Georgia statute which provided
that "any person who shall... cause a breach of the peae ... shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor" as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Id. at 528.
What is significant about this case is the dissenting opinion by Justice
Blackmun, in which he accuses the Court of "merely paying lip service to
Chaplinsy." Id. at 537 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun's dissent
indeed raised a profound question. He asked, "I wonder, now that [the Georgia
statute] is void, just what Georgia can do if it seeks to proscribe what the
Court says it still may constitutionally proscribe." Id. at 536 (Blackamun, J.,
dissenting). This fundamental question was directed at the Court's apparent
lack of guidance and clarity on the exact boundaries of the "fighting words"
doctrine. Justice Blackmun suggested that after Gooding, the Chaplinsky test is
moot as there are no statutes that could satisfy the overbreadth and vagueness
scrutiny. See id. at 536-37 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
57. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2560 (White, J., concurring).
58. Id.; see also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). Cohen was
arrested for wearing a jacket in a courthouse that bore the message, "Fuck the
Draft." Id. at 16-17. The Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice
Harlan, implicitly rejected [the argument] that psychological abuse is the
practical equivalent of a physical assault by holding that offending sensibilities
is simply not enough to justify suppression of speech. Id. at 26. The Court
explained:
No individual actually or likely to be present could reasonably have
regarded the words on [Cohen's] jacket as a direct personal insult. Nor
do we have here an instance of the exercise of the State's police power
to prevent a speaker from intentionally provoking a given group to
hostile reaction.
Id. at 20. Justice Harlan, responding to the print on Cohen's jacket, inquired,
"[h]ow is one to distinguish this from any other offensive word?" Id. at 25.
Leaving the matter to one's subjective taste, he suggested that "one man's
vulgarity is another's lyric." Id. This apparent break from the Chaplinsky
assumption that there are certain categories of speech that are undeserving of
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He also suggested that "[i]n a second break with precedent,"
the majority found that even if the ordinance "survive[d] under
the strict scrutiny applicable to other protected expression," it
would not pass constitutional muster. 6 0 Justice White found that
if the ordinance only prohibited expression not protected by the
First Amendment, it would be held constitutional. 6 1 He also
maintained that the majority seemed to hold that "a narrowly
drawn, content-based ordinance could never pass constitutional
muster if the object of that legislation could be accomplished by
banning a wider category of speech."62
While Justice Stevens, the author of a separate concurring
opinion, agreed with Justice White that the ordinance at issue was
unconstitutionally overbroad, he rejected "the allure of absolute
principles [that] skewed the analysis of both the majority and
concurring opinions." 63 Justice Stevens termed the majority's
analysis a "revision [of the] categorical approach, " 64 which to

First Amendment protection, significantly undermined Chaplinsky. See
Deborah R. Schwartz, Note, A First Amendment Justification for Regulating
Racist Speech on Campus, 40 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 733, 760 (1989/90).
59. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2560 (White, J., concurring).
60. Id.at 2554.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.at 2561 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens argued that the
Court has never limited itself either to the "fighting words" doctrine or to the
principle that content-based regulations are presumptively invalid, but rather
"repeated both of these maxims" in past opinions. Id.(Stevens, J.,
concurring). He disagreed with the Court's adherence with absolutism to the
principle that content-based regulations of expression are presumptively invalid
which led it to hold that regulation of "fighting words" by subject matter was
prohibited by the First Amendment. Id. at 2562 (Stevens, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 2562 (Stevens, J., concurring). This categorical approach,
Justice Stevens stated, was enunciated in Chaplinsky:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech,
the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to
raise any Constitutional problem.... It has been well observed that
such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are
of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality.
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him was "something of an adventure in a doctrinal
wonderland." 65 Justice Stevens, however, was "more troubled
[by the majority's] near-absolute ban on content-based regulations
"..."66
of expressions .
According to Justice Stevens, the majority had abandoned the
"rough hierarchy" created by the Court's First Amendment

jurisprudence. 67 That is, by holding that "fighting words" may
not be "regulated based on subject matter," Justice Stevens
claimed that the majority "[gave] fighting words greater
protection than [wa]s afforded commercial speech. "68

In the midst of this confusing and highly charged battle over
the boundaries

of the "fighting

words"

doctrine,

Justice

Blackmun's concurring opinion made the most sense. Justice
Blackmun suggested that perhaps this decision "will be regarded
as an aberration - a case where the Court manipulated doctrine to

strike down an ordinance whose premise it opposed, namely, that
racial threats and verbal assaults are of greater harm than other
fighting words."

69

Id. at 2561 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942)). These categories of expression are not
constitutionally protected speech. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 2562 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens criticized Justice
Scalia's concept of "obscene anti-government speech" as "fantastical." The
concept, he noted, "is a contradiction in terms: If expression is
antigovemment, it does not 'lac[k] serious... political... value' and cannot
be obscene." Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
66. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). Content-based restrictions of speech, he
noted, are "an inevitable and indispensable aspect of a coherent understanding
of the First Amendment." Id. at 2563 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice
Stevens also noted that the determination as to whether speech is deserving of
First Amendment protection or not, requires an examination of its content. Id.
(Stevens, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 2564 (Stevens, J., concurring). "Core political speech occupies
the highest, most protected position; commercial speech and nonobscene,
sexually explicit speech are regarded as a sort of second-class expression;
obscenity and fighting words receive the least protection of all." Id. (Stevens,
J., concurring).
68. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 2560-61 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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The Impact of R.A. V. on University Speech Codes
Whether R.A. V. has the profound impact of parachuting the
"fighting words" doctrine into a confused state, as Justice White
posited, 70 or if it is merely "an aberration," as Justice Blackmun
proposed, 7 1 the question remains as to the impact of this decision
on the existing university hate speech codes. It would appear that
the decision has created an additional restriction on the "fighting
words" doctrine. The R.A. V decision appears to suggest that for
speech codes to survive, they must withstand both a content and
an overbreadth scrutiny. The implication may be that the
constitutionality of speech codes may depend on the particular
wording of the codes.
The pre-R.A. V. approach limited the outer boundaries of
"fighting words" to encompass only words which were capable
of causing physical violence and which were used in face-to-face
confrontations. 72 The traditional analysis would evaluate this test
under the overbreadth doctrine. 73 This approach treated contentbased regulation of speech within the categorical exceptions as
immune from constitutional scrutiny. 74 Thus, as Justice White
noted, a code that restricted expressions that amount to face-toface confrontations and create a threat of imminent physical
70. Id. at 2560 (White, J., concurring).
71. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
72. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 524 (1971) (striking down a
Georgia statute since it was not limited "to words that 'have a direct tendency
to cause acts of violence by the person to whom, individually, the remark is
addressed'" (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573
(1942))); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20-22 (1971) (reversing Cohen's
conviction under a California statute for wearing a jacket with the inscription
"Fuck the Draft" because the words did not constitute "fighting words" but
were merely offensive and distasteful to the public).
73. The Georgia statute in Gooding was struck down on vagueness and
overbreadth grounds. Gooding, 405 U.S. at 528. The purpose of the doctrine
is to prevent the states from prohibiting constitutionally protected speech when
attempting to proscribe unprotected speech. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S.
601, 612-13 (1973).

74. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72.
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violence would be held constitutional. 75 On the other hand, codes
that prohibited expression which caused hurt feelings, annoyance
or emotional distress would be considered fatally overbroad. 76
77
Many universities with pre-R.A. V. hate speech regulations
claimed that their speech and conduct codes were within the
boundaries of "fighting words," curtailed to encompass
unprotected speech. 78 However, when challenged, the codes
were struck down on the grounds that they were fatally
overbroad. 79 In addition to threats of physical violence, the codes

75. See R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2551-52 ('White, J., concurring).
76. See id. at 2559-60.
77. See, e.g., Fred M. Hechinger, About Education, N.Y. TIM7Es, June 6,
1990, at B7. In the last decade several state and private institutions have
adopted speech codes in response to the epidemic of racial incidents on their
campuses. Id. Among such institutions are the University of Texas, the
University of Albany, the University of California, the University of
Wisconsin, the University of Michigan, the University of Pennsylvania, the
University of Oklahoma, the University of Connecticut, Brown University and
Stanford University. Id.; see also Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp
852, 866 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (holding the university speech code
unconstitutionally overbroad). The code provided in part that a student would
be subject to discipline for:
1. Any behavior, verbal or physical, that stigmatizes or victimizes an
individual on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual
orientation, creed, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status,
handicap or Vietnam-era veteran status, and that
a. Involves an express or implied threat to an individual's
academic efforts, employment, participation in University
sponsored extra-curricular activities or personal safety; or
b. Has the purpose or reasonably foreseeable effect of interfering
with an individual's academic efforts, employment,
participation in University sponsored extra-curricular
activities or personal safety; or
c. Creates an intimidating, hostile, or demeaning environment for
educational pursuits, employment or participation in
University sponsored extra-curricular activities.
Id. at 856.
78. See UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wis., 774 F.
Supp. 1163, 1169 (E.D. Wis. 1991); University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. at 864.
79. See, e.g., UWM Post, 774 F. Supp. at 1177 (holding a speech code
unconstitutionally overbroad and unduly vague); University of Mich., 721 F.
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covered emotional injury, which is not within the contour of
permissible restrictions of the "fighting words" doctrine. 80
R.A.V. alters the Court's traditional approach by stating that
even within the categorical approach, content-based restrictions
are impermissible. 8 1 This new content restriction analysis
appears to mandate that if the government wishes to impose
restrictions upon "fighting words," it must include all "fighting
words." 82 After R.A.V., if the state wishes to prohibit only a
sub-category of "fighting words," it must demonstrate that it is
not inspired by the motive to suppress an expression of ideas.
Thus, campus codes that restrict epithets based on race, religion,
gender and sexual orientation would be subject to the same
treatment as the St. Paul ordinance. Such constructions would be
held unconstitutional because they appear to proscribe speech
83
based on favoritism and viewpoint.
Justice White expressed grave doubts about the wisdom of this
doctrine. He noted:
It is inconsistent to hold that the government may proscribe an
entire category of speech because the content of that speech is
evil, (citation omitted) but that the government may not treat a
subset of that category differently without violating the First
Amendment; the content of the subset is by definition worthless
and undeserving of constitutional protection. 84
Notwithstanding the disagreement among the majority and
concurring opinions, one determinative factor has remained
unchanged. By tradition, the Court has determined that the
"fighting words" doctrine does not encompass words which by
85
their very utterance inflict psychological or emotional injury.
Supp. at 867 (finding a speech and conduct code to be unconstitutionally
overbroad both on its face and as applied).

80. See UWM Post, 774 F. Supp. at 1173; University of Mich., 721 F.
Supp. at 867.
81. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2545.

82. See id. at 2553 (White, J., concurring).
83. Id. at 2543-45.
84. Id. at 2553 (White, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
85. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (rejecting the assertion
that psychological harm is equivalent to physical harm); see also Brown v.
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Yet, to reiterate, hate motivated expressions on the nation's
university campuses are often not face-to-face, but rather directed
at a group of students, generally of similar ethnic composition. 86
Furthermore, the acts often occur in an anonymous fashion, not
allowing the victim the opportunity to confront the speaker
contemporaneously. 87 The victims rarely react through physical
confrontation, 88 rather, they experience profound psychological
pain and despair. 89

Thus, while it is possible for a university to formulate a speech
code that would prohibit all "fighting words" including only

face-to-face confrontations that lead to physical violence, this
limited formulation simply does not encompass the profound

emotional and psychological damage that such acts cause. Under
such formulation, the codes, if held constitutional, would only
protect the victims in circumstances where there is a face-to-face
confrontation with a resulting violent outburst. 90
In light of the diminishing impact of the "fighting words"
doctrine as a meaningful avenue for regulating hate speech on the
college campus, the question arises as to whether it is possible to
formulate speech codes that would pass constitutional scrutiny

under the categorical exceptions. 91 Accordingly, a separate
Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914 (1972); Lewis v. New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913
(1972); Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972). In this 1972 trilogy,
the majority vacated and remanded three convictions for use of offensive
language. Chief Justice Burger's dissent may best describe the discontent with
the Cohen principle: "When we undermine the general belief that the law will
give protection against fighting words and profane and abusive language such
as the utterances involved in these cases, we take steps to return to the law of
the jungle." Rosenfeld, 408 U.S. at 902.
86. See supra note 7.
87. See supra note 7.
88. See Lawrence, supra note 10, at 452 (being faced with racial insults
may cause minorities to be silent or to run instead of fighting); see also
Matsuda, supra note 19, at 2355-56.
89. See Matsuda, supra note 19, at 2335-41.
90. See generally Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21.
91. See Matsuda, supra note 19, at 2356. Professor Matsuda argues that
racist speech presents "an idea so historically untenable, so dangerous, and so
tied to perpetuation of violence and degradation of the very classes of human
beings who are least equipped to respond that it is properly treated as outside
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categorical exception under which hate acts may be regulated has
been suggested. 92 This category has been defined through three
identifying characteristics: "1. The message is of racial
inferiority; 2. The message is directed against a historically
oppressed group; and 3. The message is persecutorial, hateful,
and degrading." 93
This test addresses a rather narrow category of hate speech,
leaving clearly protected the wide range of racially motivated
speech that could properly be uttered in the classroom, or by
students, concerning the issues of racial superiority, affirmative
action and the like. Thus, the excludable speech would be the
deeply harmful, degrading and hateful expressions that contain no
94
social value and cause grave harm to the listeners.
II. THE BROWN VISION
While the aforementioned test is compelling, this Note suggests
an additional justification for upholding campus speech codes as
constitutional. The Court's historical decision in Brown v. Board
of Education,95 provides a fundamental basis upon which hate
speech codes at university campuses may be upheld without
disturbing the ideals of free speech.
The long term vision of Brown was to systematically eradicate
the universal wrong of racism. 96 The Brown decision recognized

the realm of protected discourse." Id. at 2357. Furthermore, Professor
Matsuda asserts that it is quite possible to present a compelling argument for a
narrow range of "racist hate messages [and still] remain true to the First
Amendment" values. Id. at 2356.
92. Id. at 2357.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 2358; see also Delgado, supra note 19, at 379. "[S]ocial science
writers hold that making racist remarks impairs, rather than promotes, the
growth of the person who makes them, by encouraging rigid, dichotomous
thinking and impeding moral development." Id.
95. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
96. See id. at 493. "Today [education] is a principal instrument in
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional
training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these
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that equal access to education is a necessary means for

eliminating racism. 97 Today, the recurring acts of hate on our
nation's college campuses, reminiscent of the pre-Brown era,
threaten the Brown promise of equal access to education for al. 98

Brown, in many respects, is the most important civil rights case
of the twentieth century. Prior to Brown, "[a]ll public schools

were segregated; public accommodations were segregated; only a

minute percentage of registered voters was black; and black
public office holders were virtually nonexistent. Black families
had less than one half the median income of white families, and

illiteracy rates were appallingly high." 99
The immediate goal of Brown was to acknowledge that
segregated schools were "inherently unequal." 100 The greater
significance of the decision, however, was a recognition by the
Supreme Court that racism is a universal wrong embedded in the

days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life
if he is denied the opportunity of an education." Id. at 493.
97. See id. at 494. The Court held that "[t]o separate [black children] from
others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a
feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." Id. The goals of equal
access have permeated society, and are by no means limited to the realm of
education. See, e.g., Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (desegregation
applied to intrastate transportation); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955)
(desegregation of golf courses); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877
(1955) (desegregation in parks and swimming pools).
98. See generally Walter R. Allen, The Color of Success: AfricanAmerican College Student Outcomes at Predominantly White and Historically
Black Public Colleges and Universities, 62 HARv. EDUC. REv. 26, 27-28
(1992). Three-fourths of currently enrolled black college students attend
predominantly white institutions. Id. The students generally emphasize feelings
of alienation, sensed hostility, racial discrimination and lack of integration. Id.
In addition, studies of African-American students suggest that many have
negative, anomic experiences in white institutions and they suffer from lower
achievement and higher attrition than white students. Id.
99. FRANK T. READ & LUCY S. McGoUGH, LET THEi BE JUDGED: THE
JUDICIAL INTEGRATION OF THE DEEP SOUTH xi (1978).
100. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 (stating that separate educational facilities are
inherently unequal).
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nation's educational institutions. 101 Further, the Court recognized
that it is appropriate for the Supreme Court of the United States
to take affnmative steps toward rectifying the institutional racism
that created segregation based on race. 102 Accordingly, the
Brown Court stated:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state

and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and
the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our
recognition of the importance of education to our democratic
society.... Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the

child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional
training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his
environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the
state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made
103
available to all on equal terms.
Thus, while the Court stopped short of declaring education a
fundamental right, it expressly asserted that "such an opportunity
where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which
must be available to all on equal terms." 104
The Brown Court, however, left undefined the exact contour of
the principle of equal access to education. 105 Perhaps, the Brown
101. See id. at 494. The Court noted that separating school children based
on race "generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
community... ." Furthermore, the Court recognized that "segregation of
white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the
colored children." Id. (quoting Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950)).
102. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
103. Id. at 493.
104. Id.
105. See generally Brown, 347 U.S. 483. The Supreme Court, in Brown,
merely addressed the question of whether segregating educational institutions
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 493.
However, the Supreme Court, post-Brown, did focus on the contours of equal
education in ruling on several cases relating to the enforcement of
desegregation. See, e.g., Swanm v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402
U.S. 1 (1971). The Court held that federal courts cannot order school boards
to adjust the racial composition of any of its schools, no matter how great the
racial imbalance between schools, unless there has been a finding that there
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holding was limited to increasing minority enrollment in
previously all white schools. Alternatively, Brown may have

mandated non-discriminatory admissions as the first step of the

06 Is it
journey toward eliminating racial discrimination. 1
conceivable that Brown mandated the creation of an atmosphere
of diversity, participation, and fulfillment of career aspirations
beyond the mere ability to enroll in the institutions of
10 7
learning?

Initially, the Brown mandate of equal access to education
focused on creating a shift in the enrollment process at all
was officially-maintained (de jure) segregation. Id. at 19-20. See also
Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979) (establishing that

where intentionally segregated educational systems operated in 1954, a prima
facie case exists that current segregation is due in part to this prior
segregation); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979)
(establishing that where intentionally segregated educational systems operated
in 1954 a prima facie case exists that current segregation is due in part to this
prior segregation).
106. See generally BARBARA ASTONE & ELSA NUMz-WORMACK,
PURSUING DvERsrry: RECRUrING COLLEGE MINORITY STUDENTS, ASHEERIC HIGHER EDUCATION REPORT 7, 3 (1990). The authors stated:

Bringing more minority students to college campuses is clearly one
important step [in ensuring academic equity], and therefore recruitment
is an essential part of any successful institutional plan for increasing
minorities' participation. It is only the beginning, however. Ensuring
academic success and graduating are the necessary complements to
achieving equity in education.
Id.
107. See generally ELIZABETH A. ABRAMOWrIZ, EQUAL EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNrrY FOR BLACKS IN U.S. HIGHER EDUCATION, AN ASsESsMENT 19

(1976). Abramowitz noted that:
Equal educational opportunity embodies three concepts - access,
distribution, and persistence....
Access means that Black students have the opportunity to enroll in
undergraduate, graduate, or professional schools. Distribution refers to
choice, the opportunity for Black students to enter different types of
institutions and fields of study. And persistence refers to the opportunity
to remain in college and complete their training in a timely fashion. In
order to have equal educational opportunity, a Black student must not
just have the opportunity to enroll in college, but a choice of institutions
and programs, and a chance to complete the training once begun.
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educational institutions. 10 8 This judicially mandated process
opened the otherwise closed gates to students of color in the
nation's educational institutions. 109
Nearly four decades after Brown, it is reasonably safe to
conclude that institutions of higher education have made
substantial progress in their admission policies for students of
color. 110 However, the rate of participation and graduation
among students of color is alarmingly low as compared to white
students. 111 Two possible reasons explaining the gap between

108. See generally JOHN E. FLEMING ET AL., THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION FOR BLACKS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 39 (1978). "During the 1960s,
under pressure from civil rights groups and activist students, many institutions
of higher education that had traditionally excluded minorities established
special recruitment and admissions policies. More than eight hundred
undergraduate institutions provided some form of special help for minority and
disadvantaged students.. . ." Id.

109. See generally PHILIP G. ALTBACH & KOF LOMOTEY,
CRISIS IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 111-13 (1991). The

THE RACIAL
authors noted
that the purpose of Brown and more recent cases is to desegregate so that
"blacks and other minorities [can] contest for expanded opportunity in
education at all levels." Id. at 111. The authors also noted that post-Brown
decisions helped to produce "critical clarification of the responsibilities of
colleges and universities to provide full and fair access." Id. The authors
further recognized that cases preceding Brown "provide an even richer and
more telling discussion of the educational policy dilemma that has and
continues to encompass greater access to higher education." Id. at 112.
110. See generally AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION, MINORrIES ON
CAMPUS, A HANDBOOK FOR ENHANCING DIvERSrrY 1 (1989) (finding that in
1960 there were 150,000 black students enrolled in higher education and that
by 1975 that number increased to one million even though "[i]lack enrollments
have remained stagnant since 1975").
111. Id. at 2-3. The study stated:
Between 1967 and 1975, the percentage of black high school graduates
24 years old or younger who were enrolled in or had completed one or
more years of college rose from 35 percent to 48 percent; over the same
period, the corresponding rate for whites grew much more slowly from
51 percent to 53 percent. However, between 1975 and 1985, while the
college participation rate for white youths continued to climb to 55
percent, the rate for blacks dropped to 44 percent.
Id. "Among 1980 high school seniors who enrolled in college, 21 percent of
the white students, compared with 10 percent of the black students and 7

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol10/iss2/11

26

1994]

Namazi and Cahill: University Hate Speech Codes

UN!VERSITY HATE SPEECHCODES

participation rates of white students and minority students are the
inferiority of the primary and secondary schools that minority
students attend 112 and the piecemeal approaches that have been
taken to increase minority participation. 113
In addition, studies have focused on the impact of the campus
environment on student participation by comparing the
participation of black students in all black colleges with the
participation of black students in predominantly white
universities. 114 For instance, a quantitative study on this issue
was conducted, where it was concluded that:
On predominantly White campuses, Black students emphasize
feelings of alienation, sensed hostility, racial discrimination, and
lack of integration. On historically Black campuses, Black
students emphasize feelings of engagement, connection,
acceptance, and extensive support and encouragement.
Consistent with accumulated evidence on human development,
these students, like most human beings, develop best in
environments where they feel valued, protected, accepted, and
socially connected. The supportive environments of historically
Black colleges communicate to Black students that it is safe to
take the risks associated with intellectual growth and
1 15
development.

It was further found that "little doubt exists over the negative
impact of hostile racial and social relationships on Black student
achievement."

1 16

Additionally, "[wihen Black students are made

percent of the Hispanic students, earned a bachelor's degree or higher degree
by spring 1986." Id.at 3.

112. Id. at 1. Since "[b]lack and hispanic students are more likely to be
poor [and] [h]eavily concentrated in inner city public schools, they frequently
receive an education inferior to that of more affluent and white students." Id.
Some steps have been taken to improve primary and secondary schools by
"expandfing] the pool of prepared students...." Id.
113. Id.at 2. "Isolated programs to attract and retain minority students,
faculty, and staff" is one approach. Id.However, "[c]omprehensive,
institution-wide policies and programs" are central to increasing minority
participation. Id.
114. Allen, supra note 98, at 39-40.
115. Id.
116. Id.at 41.
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to feel unwelcome, incompetent, ostracized, demeaned, and
assaulted, their academic confidence and performance
understandably suffer." 117
Similarly, the American Council on Education addressed the
dramatic rise in racial hostilities on campuses across the nation
and advised that "[campus] climate is so central to all other
efforts to improve minority participation, [that] it is both the
point of departure and the culmination of all other efforts." 118
The Council concluded that "[s]tudents and other members of the
campus community who feel unwelcome or alienated from the
mainstream of campus life are unlikely to remain. If they do
remain, they are unlikely to be successful." 119
In short, it is reasonably safe to conclude that Brown's vision
of educational opportunity and access for all has not been
achieved. While for students of color many barriers to success
exist in the broader context of the society, 120 universities must

117. Id.
118. AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION, MINORImFs ON CAMPUS,
HANDBOOK FOR ENHANCING DIVERSITY 113 (1989).

A

119. Id.
120. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 98, at 41-42. Professor Allen suggests

that:
African-American students' relative lack of access to and success in

U.S. higher education is not shrouded in mystery. It is the result of the
same historical, political, economic, social, cultural, and psychological
patterns that have perpetuated Black subjugation and oppression since
Blacks arrived on these shores in 1619. U.S. society has been - and in

many respects continues to be - organized to thwart, restrict, and
undercut Black progress and achievement. (citation omitted) Thus it

should come as no surprise when African Americans are 'discovered' to
suffer from disadvantages in higher education; these disadvantages

merely reflect and parallel Black disadvantages in the wider society - in
'choice' of neighborhoods, in rates of sickness and death, in quality of
primary school education, in possession of wealth, in rates of criminal
victimization and incarceration - in nearly every aspect of American
life.
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confront the challenge posed by Brown of achieving the goal of
1
equal access to education. 12

While the Supreme Court has not directly defined the
boundaries of appropriate university missions, it has spoken in
broad terms about the university's authority to exclude
expressions which substantially interfere with students' ability to
participate in the educational process.1 22 Undeniably, a hostile
and uncivil educational environment denies the unprotected
victims equal access to education. 12 3 Creating and maintaining a

121. See generally ASTONE & NuIEZ-WORMACK, supra note 106, at xv.
Their report is partially compiled with funding from the Office of Educational
Research and Improvements, U.S. Department of Education. The authors
stated summarily in their forward:
Over the past few years, the ASHE-ERIC Higher Education Report
series has published several reports dealing with the issues of
diversity .... From these reports, several general conclusions are
easily drawn: The concern over diversity is increasing. The issue of
diversity not only concerns the strength of our society's social fabric,
but also is becoming increasingly central to our economic well being.
Higher education institutions can and should play a major role in
educating a diverse citizenry that will produce leaders capable of
developing solutions for the issues of diversity in our society.
d. Additionally, a college degree provides increased employment opportunity
as well as enhanced social standing. Id. at 1-4.
122. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276-77 (1981) (stating
that a public university possesses authority to impose reasonable regulations
compatible with its educational mission upon the use of its campus and to
exclude expressions which substantially interfere with the opportunities of
other students to obtain an education); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 311-12 (1978) (stating that attainment of a diverse student body
"is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education").
But see Papish v. Board of Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 670 (1973) (stating that
"the mere dissemination of ideas-no matter how offensive to good taste-on a
state university campus may not be shut off in the name alone of 'conventions
of decency'").

123. See generally Lawrence, supra note 10, at 450. A portion of the
Stanford University Fundamental Standard Interpretation states that:
Each student has the right to equal access to a Stanford Education,
without discrimination on the basis of sex, race, color, handicap,
religion, sexual orientation, or national and ethnic origin. Harassment of
students on the basis of any of these characteristics contributes to a
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civil and safe environment for students of color ought to be one
of the reasonable missions of every university. 12 4
When confronted with hate-motivated assaults on students of

color, the university must act fast. For instance, it has been noted
that:
[The university] has strong, legitimate interests in (i) teaching
students and teachers to treat each other respectfully; (ii)
protecting minority-group students from harassment; and (iii)
protecting diversity, which could be impaired if students of color
become demoralized and leave the university, or if parents of
12 5
minority race decide to send their children elsewhere.

Similarly, it has been suggested that the university is a special
environment, "a distinct social entity, whose commitment to
enhancing the quality of speech justifies setting minimum
126
standards for the manner of speech among its members."
hostile environment that makes access to education for those subjected
to it less than equal.
Id. (quoting Fundamental Standard Interpretation: Free Expression and
Discriminatory Harassment, adopted by Stanford University June 1990).
124. See generally Robin M. Hulshizer, Comment, Securing Freedomfrom
Harassment Without Reducing Freedom of Speech: Doe v. University of
Michigan, 76 IOWA L. REV. 383, 396 (1991) (stating that "one of the most
compelling arguments for university adoption of student-conduct policies is that
group violence actually jeopardizes the academic environment"); Thomas L.
McAllister, Comment, Rules and Rights Colliding: Speech Codes and the First
Amendment on College Campuses, 59 TENN. L. REv. 409, 419 (1992) (stating
that "part of the university's mission [is] to teach students to 'express
themselves in acceptable, civil terms'" (quoting Chief Justice Burger's dissent
in Papish v. Board of Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973))).
125. See Delgado, supra note 19, at 376; see also Schwartz, supra note 58,
at 768; Sean M. SeLegue, Comment, Campus Anti-Slur Regulations: Speakers,
Victims, and the First Amendment, 79 CAL. L. RV. 919, 944 (1991)
(analogizing the university environment to the captive audience doctrine and
proposing a civility zone under which students are protected from assaulting
speech).
126. J. Peter Byrne, Racial Insults and Free Speech Within the University,
79 GEo. L.J. 399, 416 (1991). Professor Byrne articulates compelling interests
for the regulation of speech on the university campus:
The university has three moral commitments that shape its activities:
these are to the values of truth, humanism, and democracy.
Consideration of the educational mission of the modem university under
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Membership in the university community is reserved for those
who are capable of engaging in an atmosphere conducive to a
high quality of instruction and scholarship. 127 In this special
community, both teachers and students are "subject to
disciplinary norms deemed to facilitate criticism and discourse;
those who do not meet the standards of speech set by the
university are subject to penalties - students through grades and
faculty through the denial of promotion or tenure." 128
In sum, speech codes specifically formulated to address the
substantial harm caused by hate expressions are indeed among the
necessary steps universities must take to ensure that students of
color are given the same educational opportunity as the rest of
the student population. 12 9 Such narrowly designed codes of
conduct are a necessary means of ensuring the vitality of the
Brown mandate, equal access to education for all.
CONCLUSION

Our society needs to look back in time and assess the damage
that racial strife has caused America, and reflect on the solutions
that were finally found. Brown v. Board of Education,130 was a
landmark case not only because it provided elementary school
students with equal educational opportunities, but additionally
because it recognized that racism is an intolerable wrong in our
society.
The Supreme Court's decision in Brown was an effective
affirmative step toward eliminating the universal ill of racism
from this nation. However, the Court must take further steps to
insure that the current tide of racial hatred does not destroy the
the headings of these three commitments can help clarify the grounds
upon which the Constitution can countenance distinct treatment of the
university.
Id. at 418-19.
127. Id. at 416-17.
128. Id. at 417.
129. See Matsuda, supra note 19 and accompanying text. The Matsuda test
is an appropriate example of the narrow type of expression the universities
may properly regulate.
130. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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progress of the last four decades. In the spirit of Brown, the
Supreme Court must once again act to preserve the diversity of
American society, and end the damage that is caused by these
acts of hate.
Nooshin Namazi
James H. Cahill
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